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We investigate the impact of reforms on employment protection for temporary contracts on 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) using panel data of industries across 14 European countries. 
Within-industry variation over the period 1992-2007 is exploited to capture reforms. The 
legislation on temporary contracts (EPT) affects the use of such contracts, making it a valid 
instrument to prove a causal relationship between a change in legislation and macroeconomic 
performances. Indeed, the two stage estimates emphasize the negative relationship between 
the share of temporary employment and TFP at the industrial level. Marginal effects prove 
that increasing regulation on temporary jobs has a strong negative impact on the use of fixed-
term contracts if employment protection on regular contract (EPR) is low. When employment 
protection on open-ended contract reaches its highest level; this effect is stronger. Our study 
shows that asymmetric institutional change might indeed leads to lower productivity growth 
through a surge in temporary employment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Employment protection legislation sets norms and procedures to be followed for the two main 
types of labor contracts: open-ended and fixed term contracts
1
. Employment protection on 
open-ended contracts (hereafter “EPR”) imposes legal restrictions on dismissals and sets 
compensations to workers in case of early termination. Employment protection on temporary 
jobs (hereafter “EPT”) imposes restrictions on the hiring of workers under temporary 
contracts (Boeri and Ours, 2013).  
The present analysis proposes to investigate the link between employment legislation and 
productivity at the industrial level with a focus on the use of fixed-term contracts.  
 
Theoretically the easing in legislation on temporary contracts can be assimilated to a 
reduction in firing costs, thus the impact on productivity of such institutional change is 
ambiguous. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) build a general equilibrium model of job 
reallocation across firms, calibrated using data from the US Census of Manufactures and 
simulate a tax on job destruction to measure the welfare cost of such policy. They find that the 
substantial welfare costs emerge from the decrease in average productivity. Indeed the 
reduction in employment turnover has a limited impact on welfare and the fraction of total 
payroll that is paid in dismissal costs accounts for less than 5% of total payroll. But on the 
other hand, the tax on job destruction creates a distortion and firms allocate resources less 
effectively. As a consequence labor productivity substantially drops which dampens welfare. 
It should be cautioned that the analysis focuses on the costs associated with certain policies 
and ignores benefits that may be associated with employment protection. However according 
to this model a surge in temporary employment might improve productivity. Samaniego 
(2006) develops a model where plants reduce its workforce when they fall behind in 
technology. Since employment protection offsets this mechanism, in countries where 
regulations are more stringent firms are encouraged to specialize in industries with slow rate 
of technological change. The paper focuses on the cross-industry effect of employment 
protection and regards industry composition as a new channel through which labor market 
legislation impacts macroeconomic aggregates. Saint Paul (2002) also argues that high firing 
costs induce a bias towards secondary innovation with smaller productivity growth potential. 
As a result countries implementing employment reforms might engage in high-tech activities 
                                                          
1
 agency work and other atypical contracts will be assimilated to this category in the present analysis 
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and display higher total factor productivity levels. A third theoretical channel through which 
employment protection might decrease productivity is rational worker shirking behavior 
(Shapiro Stiglitz 1984). Layoff protection might reduce the incentive for workers to exert 
efforts, because the threat of layoff in response to low performance is smaller. Thus, 
temporary workers might work harder than permanent ones and increase productivity. Other 
trends of the literature document the positive impact of employment protection on 
productivity. The theory of human capital (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974) predicts that 
investment in skills results in higher productivity. Individual investment decisions in 
education and training are linked to the expected returns of education. Both employment 
uncertainty associated with a fixed-term contract and the risk of unemployment after 
termination of a fixed-term contract have negative consequences on the returns to investment 
in education, training and further training.  
 
Several empirical studies focus on the increase in temporary employment and the channels 
through which it affects productivity. Firm level analysis focusing on Spain (Dolado et al., 
2012) and Italy (Cappellari et al., 2012) find a negative and significant impact of temporary 
employment on productivity. Lisi (2013) is the only industry-level analysis that finds a 
significant impact of temporary employment on productivity. However Lisi (2013) does not 
emphasize the role played by asymmetric employment reforms.  In the present paper, we 
document the institutional complementarity between legislation on regular and temporary 
jobs, its influence on the actual use of temporary jobs, which in turn is expected to affect 
macroeconomic performances. Indeed, the high protection for permanent employment along 
with a less stringent regulation for temporary jobs appears as a driving force behind the 
development of fixed-term contracts. We want to test this hypothesis and complement the 
literature on asymmetric institutional change (Cahuc & Postel-Vinay, 2002; Boeri and 
Garibaldi 2007) that points to bad consequences of such reforms on both employment and 
productivity.  Our results are consistent with the literature: the legislations on regular and 
temporary contracts jointly influence the use of fixed-term contracts, and asymmetric 
institutional change might indeed leads to lower productivity.  
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THE DATA 
 
 The study includes 14 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, Portugal and the United-
Kingdom
2
) and 13 sectors (see appendix) from 1992 to 2007.  
The main source of data is EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts (November 
2009 Release, updated March 2011) constructed by the Groningen Growth and Development 
Center (GGDC). We use information on multifactor productivity (TFP). The methodology of 
EUKLEMS ensures conceptual consistency between variables. Further documentation can be 
found in O'Mahony and Timmer (2009).   
Employment protection legislation indicators are provided by the OECD. A set of two 
indicators is used: Employment protection for regular contracts, including collective 
dismissals (EPRC) and Employment protection for temporary contracts (EPT)
3
. EPR imposes 
legal restrictions on dismissals and sets compensations to workers to be paid by their former 
employers in case of early termination of an open-ended contract. EPT imposes restrictions on 
the hiring of workers under temporary contracts. See the appendix for more details. 
The last source of data mobilized is Labor Force Survey data provided by 
EUROSTAT. The data are used to document the composition of the labor force within sectors 
in terms of skills, work contract and tenure. At the national level, unemployment rates are 
considered.  
 
 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
The exploratory analysis relies on a reduced form regression: 
 
                                                          (1) 
 
                                                          
2
 Data on TFP are unavailable for Greece and Portugal. Therefore in the estimates including TFP Portugal and 
Greece are dropped 
3 
 Data on collective dismissals is only available from 1998. Since the time span of the study is from 1995-2007, 
legislation on collective dismissals will not be considered here .We use EPRC_V1, which corresponds to the 
index of employment protection for regular workers (EPR_V1).  
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The indexes indicate countries (i), industries (j) and time (t). D stands for a set of dummy 
controlling for each dimension of the dataset. The objective is to establish a naïve relationship 
between temporary employment and productivity. Explanatory variables are lagged values
4
. 
 
This specification fails to take into account skill composition and labor market conditions. 
Unemployment and the share of high skilled workers are thus included in the equation: 
 
                                                                           (2) 
 
As opposed to “between estimator” focusing on cross-sectional differences that might reflect 
measurement errors, we use a within estimator that considers variation in TFP in each industry 
in a country, over time. Since we use country-industry fixed effects, variables available at the 
country-level (such as unemployment or employment protection) are not correlated with our 
fixed effects. Unobservable differences between countries constant over time (such as variety 
of capitalism, other labor market institutions etc that influence both productivity and 
employment protection legislation) are controlled for. We seek to identify reforms on 
temporary employment that occurred during the period considered. Although employment 
protection on regular contracts did not vary much over time, we consider that employment 
protection on temporary contracts provides sufficient variation to produce robust estimates of 
the impact of employment reforms on productivity. See descriptive statistics in the next 
section.  
We study the level of TFP as opposed to productivity growth because we hypothesize that to 
capture the impact of temporary employment on the dynamic efficiency of production, a 
longer time span is required. Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that the reforms in 
employment protection are too recent to have had an influence on innovation. The level of 
TFP is regarded as a measure of allocative efficiency to assess the complementarity between 
capital and labor inputs. Estimations using TFP growth were constantly insignificant
5
.  
 
 
The reduced-form regression suffers from several limitations. The most important of which is 
its incapacity to control for endogeneity. Indeed, labor market conditions, the composition of 
skills, or demand shocks affect both the use of temporary contracts and TFP. As a 
                                                          
4
 Results remain unchanged when present values are used 
5
 Tables are available upon request 
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consequence, we use an instrumental variable to prove a causal relation between temporary 
employment and TFP. Employment protection legislation is used as an instrument since it 
directly influences the share of temporary employment but influences productivity only 
through the use of temporary contracts. The following two-stage least-squares regression is 
estimated: 
 
                                                                              (3) 
                                              (4) 
 
Equation (3) corresponds to the first stage of the estimation process.   is the estimated 
instrument corresponding to the share of temporary employment in each industry.  
 
 
The next step is to test the complementarity between EPR and EPT. We hypothesize that the 
relationship between legislation and the share of temporary employment is non linear, and that 
there is a joint effect of legislations on the share of temporary employment. Thus a translog 
(transcendendal logarithmic) function is estimated:  
 
                                                                 
  
           
                                           (5) 
 
Lntemp represents the log of the share of temporary contracts. It is explained by the log of the 
legislation on temporary and regular contracts, a quadratic term for both of them, year dummy 
variables and a country-by-industry dummy. We then calculate marginal effects to see if the 
impact of legislation for temporary employment (EPT) on the share of temporary contracts is 
different according to the level of regulation on regular contracts: 
 
       
    
                     
 
EPR is set to its minimum, mean less one standard deviation, mean, mean plus one standard 
deviation and maximum. 
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Finally, equation (3) is estimated again, using an index of dualisation (dual) as instrument: 
 
     
   
   
 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
As stated in the previous section, the OECD index of legislation on permanent contract has 
remained almost unchanged over the period considered.  
 
 
 
However temporary employment has been subject to more reforms. There is a clear 
decreasing trend from 2.74 to 1.78 in 2007. It has to be noted that countries are heterogeneous 
in the reforms implemented. In Italy for example, the EPT index reduced from 4.75 to 2 over 
the period, while in Ireland and the United-Kingdom the restrictions on the use of fixed-term 
contracts were increased.  
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As a result EU countries appear to converge towards a medium level of legislation on 
temporary employment while legislation on open-ended contracts is almost untouched. The 
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above graphic shows that with the exception of the UK, Ireland and Finland, the EU has 
become more dual during the study period.  
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
As a preliminary approach, reduced-form regressions are estimated. We seek to analyze the 
impact of temporary employment (expressed as the log of the share of temporary employment 
in each industry considered) on Total Factor Productivity. A set of dummies controlling for 
time, country and industry fixed effects are implemented. The results presented in table 1 
show a significantly positive relationship between the share of temporary employment and 
Total Factor Productivity. When additional controls are included, results are unchanged: the 
higher the share of temporary employment in an industry, the higher the TFP. This result is 
inconsistent with the literature and is very likely to reflect endogeneity.  
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TABLE 1 
Reduced-form regressions (fixed effect model) 
Dependent variable: Total Factor Productivity 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Lnshareoftemp(t-1) 0.039*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.032*** 
 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) 
LnUnemp(t-1) 
    
0.022* -0.179 -0.041 0.023* 
     
(0.013) (0.238) (0.037) (0.013) 
lnshareLS(t-1) 
    
-0.079*** -0.081*** -0.077*** -0.077*** 
     
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) 
constant 4.870*** 4.952*** 4.827*** 4.708*** 4.733*** 5.130*** 4.769*** 4.544*** 
 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.062) (0.019) (0.051) (0.388) (0.099) (0.050) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
industry dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
country dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
country year dummies No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Number of Obs 2079 2079 2079 2079 1988 1988 1988 1988 
individuals 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses               
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
        
 
In order to control for endogeneity, a two-stage equation is estimated (presented in table 2). 
Employment protection legislation is used as instrument. We want to emphasize the channel 
through which employment legislation affects productivity. This time, as predicted by the 
literature, a higher share of temporary employment reduces Total Factor Productivity.  
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TABLE 2 
Two stage estimates  
 
FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES          Dependent variable: share of temporary 
employment 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
lnUnemp(t-1) 0.598*** 0.599*** 0.597*** 0.597*** 0.575*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lnept(t-1) -0.364*** -0.371*** -0.366*** -0.374*** -0.510*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnLS(t-1) 
 
-0.134*** 
 
-0.138*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Lnepr(t-1) 
  
-0.179** -0.201** -0.299*** 
   
(0.025) (0.012) (0.000) 
lneptXlnepr(t-1) 
    
0.225*** 
     
(0.000) 
      SECOND STAGE ESTIMATES            Dependent variable: Total 
Factor Productivity   
Lnshareoftemp(t-1) -0.068*** -0.046* -0.070*** -0.048* -0.061** 
 
(0.007) (0.068) (0.006) (0.054) (0.013) 
lnUnemp(t-1) 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.093*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnLS(t-1) 
 
-0.077*** 
 
-0.076*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Lnepr(t-1) 
  
0.064* 0.061* 
 
   
(0.050) (0.056) 
 
      year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 2079 1988 2079 1988 2079 
individuals 156 156 156 156 156 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    Instruments: Employment Protection on Temporary contracts column 1 to 4 
Column 5: Employment Protection on Temporary contracts (EPT), Employment Protection on 
Regular contracts (EPR) and EPTxEPR 
 
 
We now focus on the first stage of the estimated relationship. Marginal effects are estimated 
to test whether employment protection on regular contracts affects the use of temporary 
employment (table 3 and 4). 
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Table 3: The impact of regulation on temporary employment (fixed effect model) 
Dependent variable: the share of temporary employment 
 
Table 3   
 
Table 4 
 lnept(t-1) -0.168*** 
 
Minimum -0.169*** 
 
(0.047) 
  
(0.045) 
lnept*lnepr(t-1) -0.043 
 
Mean less one standard deviation -0.189*** 
 
(0.062) 
  
(0.026) 
lnepr(t-1) -0.163* 
 
Mean -0.204*** 
 
(0.091) 
  
(0.026) 
lnunemp(t-1) 0.639*** 
 
Mean plus one standard deviation -0.219*** 
 
(0.029) 
  
(0.040) 
lnshareLS(t-1) 0.015 
 
Maximum -0.233*** 
 
(0.041) 
  
(0.058) 
year dummies Yes 
 
year dummies Yes 
Number of Obs 2313 
 
Number of Obs 2313 
individuals 182 
 
individuals 182 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    
 
As emphasized by the literature, the impact of legislation on temporary employment is not 
independent from legislation on regular contract. Table 4 shows when EPR is at its maximum 
value, the marginal effect of a variation in EPT is the strongest. When EPR is set at its 
minimal value, raising EPT strongly reduces temporary employment. This effect is all the 
more important the higher the protection on regular contracts is. The opposite is true for a 
decrease in EPT. The theoretical literature predicts that when employment protection is too 
stringent for permanent contracts, employers are prompted to resort to fixed-term contracts 
(Cahuc & Postel-Vinay, 2002). Consequently, asymmetric institutional change (decreasing 
protection on temporary jobs while keeping unchanged protection on regular contracts) is 
expected to boost temporary employment. Our estimates are in line with this view. 
 
Secondly, a translog function is estimated to take into account the non linear relationship 
between the level of regulation and the use of fixed-term contracts (table 5). Marginal effects 
are computed: table 6 displays the impact of legislation on regular contracts at various levels 
of legislation on temporary jobs and confirms the results of table 4: : reducing legislation on 
temporary jobs increases the share of temporary employment the higher the regulation on 
open-ended contracts is.    
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Table 5: Translog function (fixed effect estimates) 
 
LnEPT(t-1) 0.099 
 
(0.063) 
LnEPR(t-1) -2.477*** 
 
(0.308) 
LnEPTxLnEPR(t-1) -0.375*** 
 
(0.093) 
LnEPT2(t-1) -0.029 
 
(0.018) 
LnEPR2(t-1) 1.424*** 
 
(0.193) 
LnU(t-1) 0.683*** 
 
(0.029) 
LnshareLS(t-1) -0.075* 
 
(0.042) 
Constant -2.824*** 
  (0.140) 
year dummies Yes 
Number of Obs 2727 
individuals 224 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
Table 6: Impact of fixed-term employment protection on the share of temporary 
contracts conditional on employment protection on regular contracts  
 
Minimum 0.057 
 
(0.070) 
Mean less one standard deviation -0.117*** 
 
(0.033) 
Mean -0.247*** 
 
(0.026) 
Mean plus one standard deviation -0.378*** 
 
(0.048) 
Maximum -0.503*** 
  (0.076) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Finally in table 7 we propose an IV estimation using as instrument an index of dualism in 
regulation of the labor market (EPR/EPT).  
 
TABLE 7 
Two stage estimates  
 
FIRST STAGE ESTIMATE Dependent variable: share of temporary 
employment 
  [1] [2] [3] 
lnUnemp(t-1) 0.646*** 0.629*** 0.622*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Lndual(t-1) 0.341*** 0.387*** 0.379*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnepr(t-1) 
 
-0.563*** -0.567*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
lnLS(t-1) 
  
0.000 
   
(0.992) 
    SECOND STAGE ESTIMATES       Dependent variable: Total Factor 
Productivity 
Lnshareoftemp(t-1) -0.055** -0.060** -0.045* 
 
(0.038) (0.016) (0.078) 
lnUnempt-1 0.099*** 0.103*** 0.096*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnepr(t-1) 
 
0.019 0.015 
  
(0.586) (0.662) 
lnLS(t-1) 
  
-0.061*** 
   
(0.000) 
    year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 2312 2312 2212 
individuals 175 175 175 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   
 
As expected, dual employment protection legislation decreases Total Factor Productivity. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Using panel data of industries across 12 European countries over the period 1992-2007 we 
investigate the impact of reforms on employment protection for temporary contracts on Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP). We control for the rate of unemployment and skill composition and 
solve the endogeneity issue using an instrumental variable. Our study confirms that temporary 
employment has a significant and negative impact on productivity. Additionally, asymmetric 
institutional change is documented. We find that lowering employment protection on 
temporary jobs while employment protection on regular contracts is high creates a surge in 
temporary employment that is not desirable for productivity performances. It has to be 
mentioned that marginal effects provide insights into the impact on temporary employment of 
a change in the regulation. However the analysis does not produce evidence on the optimal 
level of regulation.  
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APPENDIX 
 
LISTE OF SECTORS  
 
 
AtB  Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
D  Manufacturing 
E  Electricity, gas and water supply 
F  Construction 
G  Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods 
H  Hotels and restaurants 
I  Transport, storage and communication 
J  Financial intermediation 
K  Real estate, renting and business activities, consulting 
L  Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 
M  Education 
N  Health and social work 
O  Other community, social and personal service activities 
 
 
THE OECD EPL INDICATORS 
Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts incorporates three aspects of dismissal 
protection:  
(i) Procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such as 
notification and consultation requirements;  
(ii) Notice periods and severance pay, which typically vary by tenure of the employee;  
(iii) Difficulty of dismissal, as determined by the circumstances in which it is possible to dismiss 
workers, as well as the repercussions for the employer if a dismissal is found to be unfair (such as 
compensation and reinstatement). 
Regulation of temporary contracts includes: 
(i) Regulation of fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts with respect to the types of work for 
which these contracts are allowed and their duration 
(ii) Regulation governing the establishment and operation of temporary work agencies and 
requirements for agency workers to receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in 
the user firm 
 
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.28
